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Abstract. In order to successfully reach an agreement in a negotiation,
both parties rely on each other to make concessions. The willingness to
concede also depends in large part on the opponent. A concession by the
opponent may be reciprocated, but the negotiation process may also be
frustrated if the opponent does not concede at all.
This process of concession making is a central theme in many of the
classic and current automated negotiation strategies. In this paper, we
present a quantitative classiﬁcation method of negotiation strategies that
measures the willingness of an agent to concede against diﬀerent types
of opponents. The method is then applied to classify some well-known
negotiating strategies, including the agents of ANAC 2010. It is shown
that the technique makes it easy to identify the main characteristics
of negotiation agents, and can be used to group negotiation strategies
into categories with common negotiation characteristics. We also observe,
among other things, that diﬀerent kinds of opponents call for a diﬀerent
approach in making concessions.
Keywords: Automated bilateral negotiation, Classiﬁcation, Concession,
Cooperation, Competition, Negotiation strategy.
1 Introduction
In bilateral negotiation, an opening oﬀer is usually met with a counteroﬀer, and
this then deﬁnes the initial bargaining range [12] of the negotiation. Sometimes
the other party will immediately accept the oﬀer, or will state that the set of
demands is unacceptable, breaking oﬀ the negotiation. But usually, after the
ﬁrst round of oﬀers, the question is: what concession is to be made next? One
can choose to signal a position of ﬁrmness and stick to the original oﬀer. Or one
can take a more cooperative stance, and choose to make a concession. If one side
is not prepared to make concessions, the other side must capitulate, or more
commonly, the negotiation w i l le n du pi nab r e a ko ﬀ .
The making of concessions is therefore central to a successful negotiation.
Without them, negotiations would not exist [12]. Negotiation can even be deﬁned
in terms of making concessions: Pruitt [16] deﬁnes it as a process by which a
joint decision is made by two or more parties that ﬁrst verbalise contradictory
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demands and then move towards agreement by a process of concession making
or search for new alternatives.
Many of the classic negotiation strategies are characterized by this process of
concession making throughout the negotiation. For example, the time dependent
tactics such as Boulware and Conceder [5] are characterised by the fact that
they steadily concede throughout the negotiation process. Other strategies, like
behaviour dependent tactics (such as Tit for Tat) [1,4] base their concessions on
the concessions of the other negotiating party.
The choice for what concessions to make depends in large part on the oppo-
nent. A concession by the opponent may be reciprocated by another concession,
leading to a whole progression of concessions. On the other hand, the negotia-
tion process can easily be frustrated if the opponent adopts a take-it-or-leave-it
approach. Against this background, this paper studies negotiation strategies ac-
cording to the way they concede towards diﬀerent types of opponents.
This work advances the state-of-the-art in automated negotiation in the fol-
lowing ways. We present a new classiﬁcation method for negotiation strategies,
based on their pattern of concession making against diﬀerent kinds of opponents.
We introduce a deﬁnition of Concession Rate (CR) which measures the coop-
erativeness of an agent. We present a technique to quantitatively measure the
CR against two extreme types of strategies: a take-it-or-leave-it strategy, and
a conceding tactic. We then apply this technique to classify some well-known
negotiating strategies, including the agents of ANAC 2010. This gives, for the
ﬁrst time, insight into the negotiation strategy space of the ANAC 2010 agents.
It also aids our understanding of what concession making strategies are eﬀective
in settings such as ANAC.
In the discussion of our experimental results, we conclude that our technique
has the desirable property of grouping negotiation strategies into categories with
common negotiation characteristics. Among other things, we observe that diﬀer-
ent kinds of opponents call for a diﬀerent approach in making concessions. For
instance, a successful negotiating agent should behave competitively, especially
against very cooperative strategies.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an
overview of concession making in negotiation, including our adopted model of
negotiation, and the deﬁnition of concession rate. In Section 3 we outline a
method to compute the concession rate, followed by Section 4 that presents our
experimental results. In Section 5 we discuss our ﬁndings, and ﬁnally, Section 7
presents our conclusions and our plans for future work.
2 Concession Making in Negotiation
In earlier work on conﬂict management through negotiation, the negotiation
stance was characterized by two orientations: cooperative and competitive [3].
The theory relates to two basic types of goal interdependence that negotiators
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a way that their goal attainments are positively correlated (‘sink or swim to-
gether’), or the interdependence is negative, namely when the goal attainments
are negatively correlated (‘when one swims, one sinks’).
However, a negotiator’s stance is usually not limited to one of the two ori-
entations, because negotiation is a dynamic process and the position of the ne-
gotiators can change in response to the other party’s information or behavior
[12]. In this paper, we take the stance that negotiators can exhibit a mixture of
the two orientations, mainly depending on the type of opponent (see Figure 1).
For example, a negotiator may cooperate with a cooperative opponent, but the
same negotiator may be very competitive when facing competition. That is, in
this case it matches the behavior of the opponent.
Conversely, a negotiator can be cooperative towards a competitive opponent
and at the same time exploit cooperative opponents by playing competitive
against them. In that case, it inverts the opponent’s behavior.
Fig.1. The diagram of conceding behavior against both cooperative and competitive
opponents
This way, we distinguish four types of negotiation orientations depending on
the behavior against the opponent (see Table 1): Inverter, Conceder, Competitor,
and Matcher. Every negotiation orientation corresponds to a diﬀerent stance
towards either of the two types of opponents. The main contribution of this
paper is to deﬁne a formal, mathematical procedure for classifying agents into
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Table 1. Four types of negotiation orientations
Orientation vs. Conceder vs. Hardliner
Inverter Exploiting Yielding
Conceder Cooperating Yielding
Competitor Exploiting Competing
Matcher Cooperating Competing
2.1 Negotiation Model
We consider bilateral negotiations, i.e. a negotiation between two parties or
agents A and B. The agents negotiate over issues that are part of a negoti-
ation domain, and every issue has an associated range of alternatives or values.
A negotiation outcome consists of a mapping of every issue to a value, and the
set Ω of all possible outcomes is called the outcome space. The outcome space
is common knowledge to the negotiating parties and stays ﬁxed during a single
negotiation session.
We further assume that both parties have certain preferences prescribed by
a preference proﬁle over Ω. These preferences can be modeled by means of a
normalized utility function U, which maps a possible outcome ω ∈ Ω to a
real-valued number in the range [0,1]. In contrast to the outcome space, the
preference proﬁle of the agents is private information.
Finally, the interaction between negotiating parties is regulated by a negotia-
tion protocol that deﬁnes the rules of how and when proposals can be exchanged.
We use the alternating-oﬀers protocol [17] for bilateral negotiation, in which the
negotiating parties exchange oﬀers in turns.
As in [18], we assume a common global time, represented here by T =[ 0 ,D].
The alternating-oﬀers protocol is supplemented with a deadline D at the end
of the time line, so for any t ∈T , we stipulate that the deadline has been
reached when t = D, at which moment both agents receive utility 0. This is
the same setup as [6], with the exception that issues are not necessarily real-
valued and both agents have the same deadline. We represent by xt
A→B the
negotiation outcome proposed by agent A to agent B at time t.Anegotiation
thread (cf. [5,18]) between two agents A and B at time t ∈T is deﬁned as a
ﬁnite sequence
H
t
A↔B :=

x
t1
p1→p2,x
t2
p2→p3,x
t3
p3→p4,...,x
tn
pn→pn+1

,
where
1. tk ≤ tl for k ≤ l, the oﬀers are ordered over time T ,
2. pk = pk+2 ∈{ A,B} for all k, the oﬀers are alternating between the agents,
3. All ti represent instances of time T ,w i t htn ≤ t,
4. xtk
pk→pk+1 ∈ Ω for k ∈{ 1,...,n}, the agents exchange complete oﬀers.
Additionally, the last element of Ht
A↔B may be equal to one of the particles
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When agent A receives an oﬀer xt
B→A from agent B sent at time t,i th a st o
decide at a later time t  >twhether to accept the oﬀer, or to send a counter-
oﬀer xt

A→B. Given a negotiation thread Ht
A↔B between agents A and B,w e
can express the action performed by A with an decision function [6,18]. The
resulting action is used to extend the current negotiation thread between the
two agents. If the agent does not accept the current oﬀer, and the deadline has
not been reached, it will prepare a counter-oﬀer by using a bidding strategy or
tactic to generate new values for the negotiable issues.
Tactics can take many forms, e.g. time-dependent, resource dependent, imi-
tative, and so on [18]. In our setup we will consider the tactics as given and try
to categorize them according to their willingness to concede.
2.2 Concession Rate
In this section we introduce the notion of concession rate which quantiﬁes the
amount an agent has conceded towards the opponent during a negotiation. It is
generally not enough to simply consider the utility of the agreement as a measure
for the concession rate. For instance, a negotiator may not get an agreement
before the deadline. In that case, both parties receive zero utility, but this gives
no information about the concessions that were made. Therefore, we deﬁne the
concession rate in terms of the minimum utility a negotiator has demanded
during the negotiation.
Suppose a player A has a utility function UA, mapping any outcome in Ω into
the range [0,1]. As we have assumed that the utility function is normalized in our
setting, there will exist an optimal outcome ω
opt
A ∈ Ω for which UA(ω
opt
A )=1 .I n
typical negotiation domains, the corresponding utility UB(ω
opt
A ) of this outcome
is far from optimal for player B, because the best outcome for A is typically not
the best outcome for B.P l a y e rB should be able to always obtain at least this
outcome in a negotiation, as A will always be inclined to accept it. We shall refer
to this utility as the full yield utility (FYUB)o fp l a y e rB (see Fig. 2). Intuitively,
it is equal to his bottom line utility.
Note that an optimal outcome ω
opt
A is not necessarily unique, but typical
domains (including those considered in ANAC and hence, in this paper) all have
unique optimal outcomes for both players, so that the full yield utility is well-
deﬁned.
For any t ∈T,l e t
H
t
A→B =

x
s
A→B ∈ H
t
A↔B | s ≤ t

denote all bids oﬀered by A to B until time t in an active negotiation thread.
We can now formulate the minimum utility that agent A demanded during the
negotiation thread Ht
A→B. That is to say, we consider the largest concession the
player has made so far:
MIN
t
A =m i n {UA(x) | x ∈ H
t
A→B}
Informally, MIN
t
A denotes the lowest that A is willing to bid up until time t.T h e
inverse of this is called the yield of player A. The lower player B is willing to go,148 T. Baarslag, K. Hindriks, and C. Jonker
Fig.2. The yield of player A is determined by MIN
t
A
the larger the yield. A yield of zero means the player has made no concession
whatsoever (and therefore his demanded utility remains equal to one); A yield
of 1−FYU means the player has yielded fully (see Fig. 2). That is, it is deﬁned
as:
Yield
t
A =1− max

MIN
t
A,FYUA

.
The Concession Rate CR
t
A ∈ [0,1] of player A up until time t is then simply
the normalized yield:
CR
t
A =
Yield
t
A
1 − FYUA
.
By normalizing, it is guaranteed that if CR
t
A =0 ,t h e nA has not conceded at
all, while for CR
t
A =1 ,p l a y e rA has conceded fully (i.e., up to its full yield
utility). Normalizing has the added beneﬁt of reducing domain bias: in a typical
competitive domain such as Itex–Cypress (deﬁned in the experimental section
below) players may obtain utilities anywhere between 0.2 and 1, while in very
cooperative domains utilities may vary between 0.9 and 1. Normalization ensures
that the concession rate can be compared over such diﬀerent domains.
This paper only deals with the concession rate CR
D
A of a player A during the
entire negotiation thread. We shall denote this simply by CRA.W ea l s oo m i t
the subscript A when it is clear from the context.A Concession-Based Classiﬁcation Method of Negotiation Strategies 149
3M e t h o d
In order to classify agents according to their concession rate, we considered a
negotiation setup with the following characteristics. We selected a set of agents
(introduced later) and let them negotiate against both a very cooperative and
a very competitive opponent. The opponent tactics that we use to measure
concession rates are simple, non-adaptive negotiation tactics. This ensures that
the results depend as much as possible on the agent’s own negotiating tactic. To
be more precise, we aim for three opponent characteristics:
1. Simplicity
If the opponent negotiation tactic is simple and easy to understand, then
the results depend on the agent’s own negotiating tactic, which makes them
easier to interpret.
2. Regularity
We want to give the agent enough time to show its bidding behavior; there-
fore, the opponent should not end the negotiation prematurely by either
reaching an agreement too fast or breaking oﬀ the negotiation.
3. Deterministic behavior
In order to reduce variance in experimental results, we prefer deterministic
agents to agents that demonstrate random bidding behavior.
For the competitive opponent, we chose Hardliner (also known as take-it-or-leave-
it or Hardball [12]). This strategy simply makes a bid of maximum utility for
itself and never concedes. This is the most simple competitive strategy that can
be implemented and it ﬁts the other two criteria as well: it is deterministic, and
it gives the agent the full negotiation time to make concessions.
For the cooperative opponent, we selected Conceder Linear, i.e. the Time De-
pendent Tactic adapted from [6,5] with parameter e = 1. Depending on the
current time t ∈ [0,1], this strategy makes a bid with utility closest to
Pmin +( Pmax − Pmin) · (1 − F(t)), (1)
with
F(t)=k +( 1− k) · t
1/e.
In this experiment, we selected the standard values k =0 ,a n dPmax,P min are
respectively set to the maximum and minimum utility that can be obtained
in the domain. With these values, and setting e =1 ,w eo b t a i nav e r ys i m p l e
conceding tactic. It reduces equation (1) to
Pmin +( Pmax − Pmin) · (1 − t),
so that it linearly reduces its demanded utility (from maximum Pmax to mini-
mum Pmin) as time passes.
There exist even simpler conceding tactics such as Random Walker (which
generates random bids), or an agent that accepts immediately. However, both
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enough time to show its bidding behavior. Random Walker has the added dis-
advantage of not being deterministic. Therefore, we believe Random Walker can
serve as a useful base line strategy, but not as a useful opponent to measure an
agent’s willingness to concede. Consequently, we selected Conceder Linear as the
cooperative opponent, as it fulﬁlls the three requirements listed above.
We measured the concession rate of an agent A playing against the two agents
in the following way. Suppose agent A negotiates with either Conceder Linear, or
Hardliner. The two parties may attain a certain outcome, or reach the deadline.
In both cases, at the end of the negotiation, A has reached a certain conces-
sion rate as deﬁned in Section 2.2. The concession rate is then averaged over all
trials on various domains (see Section 4.1), alternating between the two prefer-
ence proﬁles deﬁned on that domain. E.g., on the negotiation scenario between
England and Zimbabwe, A will play both as England and as Zimbabwe.
4 Experiments
For our experimental setup we employed Genius (General Environment for
Negotiation with Intelligent multi-purpose Usage Simulation) [13]. This envi-
ronment, which is also used in ANAC, facilitates the design and evaluation of
automated negotiators’ strategies. It can be used to simulate tournaments be-
tween negotiating agents in various negotiation scenarios, such as the setup de-
scribed in this section. It supports the alternating oﬀer protocol with a real-time
deadline as outlined in our negotiation model. The default negotiation time in
Genius and in the setup of ANAC is 3 minutes per negotiation session; therefore,
we use the same value in our experiments.
4.1 Detailed Experimental Setup
Agents
In our experimental setup we included all the negotiation tactics that were sub-
mitted to The Automated Negotiating Agents Competition (ANAC 2010) [2].
ANAC is a negotiation competition aiming to facilitate and coordinate the re-
search into proﬁcient negotiation strategies for bilateral multi-issue negotiation,
similar to what the Trading Agent Competition (TAC) has achieved for the
trading agent problem [20]. The seven agents that participated in ANAC 2010
have been implemented by various international research groups of negotiation
experts. We used these strategies in our experiments as they are representative
of the current state-of-the-art in automated negotiation. In order of ﬁnal ranking
the strategies are: Agent K, Yushu, Nozomi, IAMhaggler, FSEGA, IAMcrazy-
Haggler,a n dAgent Smith.
Table 2 gives a short overview of the variety of agent strategies used in our ex-
periments. The “Time dependent strategy” column shows whether the strategies
keep track of the time that is left and change their proposals accordingly. The
next column speciﬁes what kind of learning method the agents use to generate
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Table 2. Short overview of the strategies employed by the ANAC 2010 agents
Time dependent
strategy
Learning method Deterministic
Agent K Yes All proposals No
Yushu Yes Best proposals No
Nozomi No Match compromises No
IAMhaggler Yes Bayesian learning No
FSEGA Yes Bayesian learning Yes
IAMcrazyHaggler No None No
Agent Smith Yes Learning weights Yes
In addition to the ANAC agents, we included some well-known agents to
explore some extreme cases. First, we included the Hardball strategy described
in Section 3, which consistently makes the maximum bid for itself.
We also studied three members of the Time Dependent Tactics family [5]
as deﬁned above, namely: Boulware (e =0 .2), Conceder Linear (e =1 ) ,a n d
Conceder (e = 2). We included a variant of the Relative Tit-for-Tat agent from
the same paper. This strategy, called Simple Nice Tit for Tat, tries to reproduce
the behaviour that its opponent performed in the previous step.
Finally, we included the Random Walker strategy, also known as Zero Intelli-
gence strategy [7], which randomly jumps through the negotiation space. It does
not employ any information about its own preferences to make an oﬀer.
Domains
The speciﬁcs of a negotiation domain can be of great inﬂuence on the negotiation
outcome [8]; therefore, negotiation characteristics such as concession rate have
to be assessed on negotiation domains of diﬀerent size and competitiveness (or
opposition [9]). With this in mind, we aimed for two domains (with two prefer-
ence proﬁles each) with a good spread of negotiation characteristics. We picked
two our of the three domains that were used in ANAC 2010 [2]. We omitted the
third domain (Travel) as some of the ANAC agents did not scale well and had
too many diﬃculties with it to make it a reliable testing domain.
Our ﬁrst scenario is taken from [10], which describes a buyer–seller business
negotiation. It involves representatives of two companies: Itex Manufacturing, a
producer of bicycle components and Cypress Cycles, a builder of bicycles. There
are four issues that both sides have to discuss, including the price of the compo-
nents, delivery times, etc. The opposition between the parties is strong in this
domain, as the manufacturer and consumer have naturally opposing require-
ments. Altogether, the Itex–Cypress domain contains 180 potential oﬀers.
The second domain taken from [13,14] involves a case where England and Zim-
babwe negotiate an agreement on tobacco control. The leaders of both countries
must reach an agreement on ﬁve issues. The England–Zimbabwe is of medium
opposition, because the parties have contradictory preferences for some issues,
but other issues have options that are jointly preferred by both sides. The domain
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Table 3. The four preference proﬁles used in experiments
Itex–Cyp Eng–Zim
Size 180 576
Opposition Strong Medium
4.2 Experimental Results
We present the results of the experiments in Table 4 and its graphical represen-
tation is depicted in Fig. 3.
Table 4. An overview of the concession rate of every agent in the experiments
Agent CR vs. Conceder CR vs. Hardliner
Agent K 0.12 0.18
Agent Smith 0.46 1.00
Boulware 0.14 1.00
Conceder Linear 0.43 1.00
Conceder 0.63 1.00
FSEGA 0.33 0.76
Hardliner 0.00 0.00
IAMcrazyHaggler 0.05 0.05
IAMhaggler 0.02 0.27
Nozomi 0.20 0.22
Random Walker 0.97 1.00
Simple Nice Tit for Tat Agent 0.42 0.01
Yushu 0.11 0.95
Extreme Cases
The Hardliner strategy and the Random Walker strategy are at the opposite
sides of the spectrum. Hardliner will not concede to any type of strategy, so by
deﬁnition it has CR = 0 against both Hardliner and Conceder. Consequently,
Hardliner deﬁnes the most competitive strategy possible.
On the other hand, Random Walker will make arbitrary concessions given
enough time. This makes Random Walker one of the most cooperative strate-
gies possible. Against Hardliner, there is plenty of time for Random Walker to
randomly produce a bid with which it fully concedes, so it has CR = 1 against
Hardliner. Against Conceder, it may not have time to fully concede, but it gen-
erally will produce oﬀers of very low utility in this case as well, resulting in a
CR of 0.97.
We considered three members of the Time Dependent Tactics family: Boul-
ware (e =0 .2), Conceder Linear (e = 1), and Conceder (e = 2) who are all in
the top of the chart because they have a CR equal to 1 versus the Hardliner. In
addition to the time dependent tactics, at the top of the chart we see two more
strategies: Agent Smith and Random Walker. This means all these strategies
give in fully to Hardliner and are thus fully exploited by a strategy that doesA Concession-Based Classiﬁcation Method of Negotiation Strategies 153
Fig.3. A graphical overview of the concession rates of the agents
not give in at all. All of these ﬁve strategies have a very simple bidding strategy
and are apparently not optimized to deal with very uncooperative opponents.
5 Discussion
This section makes observations regarding the clustering of diﬀerent strategies
in Fig. 3, and then classiﬁes them into the four negotiation orientations we have
discussed previously.
5.1 Clustering
Agent Smith and Conceder Linear are very close in the chart and this is no
coincidence: Agent Smith uses essentially the same strategy as the linear Con-
ceder, by ﬁrst making a proposal of maximum utility and subsequently conceding
linearly towards the opponent.
The same holds for Yushu and Boulware: the strategies are very similar, as
is indicated by their close vicinity in the chart. Like Boulware, Yushu adopts a
very competitive time dependent strategy, making larger concessions when the
negotiation deadline approaches. Both adopt a conservative concession making
strategy and are not willing to make large concession at the beginning, but prefer
to wait for their opponent to make concessions.
These two examples show that this chart can be useful to cluster strategy
types, as similar strategies have similar concession characteristics.154 T. Baarslag, K. Hindriks, and C. Jonker
Clustering also occurs on lines in the chart. For example, the three Time
Dependent Tactics all share the same behavior against Hardliner: all three ulti-
mately give in to it. This is to be expected, as any agent from the time dependent
family will oﬀer the reservation value when the deadline is being reached [6], re-
sulting in full concession to the opponent. In general, all Time Dependent Tactics
will lie on the line CR = 1 against Hardliner.
Against a more cooperative strategy like Conceder, the results are also intu-
itively clear: concessions get bigger when the parameter e ∈ (0,∞) gets bigger, so
Boulware concedes the least, while Conceder concedes the most. More generally,
when e → 0, then CR → 0. Conversely, when e →∞ ,t h e nCR → 1.
Finally, there is a big cluster of strategies in the left part of the chart, which
is populated by the top four strategies in ANAC: Agent K, IAMhaggler, Nozomi
and Yushu. The better performing strategies of ANAC have diﬀerent approaches
towards the Hardliner, but they seem to have one trait in common: they all con-
cede very little to the Conceder. In other words: they exploit the Conceder by
waiting for even bigger concessions. The fact that these strategies did very well
in ANAC seems to indicate that in order to be successful in an automated ne-
gotiation competition, an agent should behave competitively, especially against
very cooperative strategies.
5.2 Four Negotiation Orientations
We classify the diﬀerent agent strategies of Fig. 3 into the four negotiation
orientations of Fig. 1. This procedure is necessarily arbitrary; nevertheless, we
propose the following grouping.
The top left agents in the diagram can be considered to be Inverters: Yushu,
Boulware, and FSEGA. The remaining agents in the top right are then Conced-
ers, namely: Conceder Linear, Agent Smith, Conceder, and Random Walker.
The Simple Nice Tit for Tat strategy is the only strategy that can be consid-
ered a Matcher, i.e.: it does not concede to a Hardliner, but it does concede to
the Conceder. Clearly, this is to be expected from a Tit for Tat strategy, as it is
based on cooperation through reciprocity: it matches whatever the other player
did on the preceding move. The fact that this type of strategy does not occur
naturally in ANAC can be explained by our previous comments on clustering:
following a Tit for Tat strategy is not as successful in negotiation, because it
does not exploit the conceding strategies.
All of the remaining strategies are Competitors, i.e. they do not concede
much, whether it is against a cooperative or a competitive agent. The majority
of strategies that performed well during ANAC are located in this region. Again,
we observe that the successful strategies are very competitive.
6 Related Work
This paper is inspired by ideas presented in [11] (of which parts originally ap-
peared in unpublished work by Kersten in 2005). In [11], four dual negotiationA Concession-Based Classiﬁcation Method of Negotiation Strategies 155
orientations are distinguished, depending on the negotiator’s own orientation and
that of the negotiating partner. Both orientations can be either competitive or
cooperative, leading to four diﬀerent labels: Competitor, Yielder, Exploiter, and
Cooperator. We re-use these labels to name the stance of a negotiator against
diﬀerent kinds of opponents (see Fig. 1). However in our work, the negotiators
are assumed to have diﬀerent responses to diﬀerent observed behavior by the
other party. Therefore, instead of the negotiator having one particular stance
during the negotiation, the position of the negotiators can change in response
to the competitiveness of the opponent. For example, a negotiator may be both
an Exploiter (against a Cooperator), and a Yielder (against a Competitor). The
negotiator would then be called an Inverter, as he takes on the reverse role of
his opponent.
In [15], a classiﬁcation scheme is given for electronic commerce negotiation,
including characteristics of the negotiating agents. It is argued that agents can
act in a self-interested way, or altruistically, or strike a balance in between. This
choice is then seen as a component of the bidding strategy of the agent, which
ultimately decides how and when to place oﬀers, or when to withdraw, etc.
Although the paper makes this distinction in bidding characteristics, it does not
provide a deﬁnition or a way to quantify them.
Thomas [19] redeﬁnes ﬁve conﬂict–handling modes that can be applied to
negotiation: competing, collaborating, compromising, avoiding and accommo-
dating. Similar to our work, the classiﬁcation method uses two underlying di-
mensions. However, the underlying dimension are diﬀerent, namely: assertiveness
(attempting to satisfy one’s own concerns), and cooperativeness (attempting to
satisfy other’s concerns). This classiﬁcation method is phrased in qualitative, in-
tentional terms of the conﬂict-handler. Similarly, [22] distinguishes negotiation
strategies into two strategy types: distributive and integrative. This description
also focuses on the approach used by the negotiators. Our paper has a diﬀerent
focus from both papers, centering around quantitative negotiation characteristics
in response to agents having either high and low concession rates. Furthermore,
we do not classify negotiation strategies in a binary way (either cooperative or
non-cooperative), but we employ a continuous spectrum in our approach.
Currently, there are two papers that analyze the results of ANAC 2010.
Baarslag et al. [2] give a short overview of all negotiation tactics and their
rankings in the tournament, but they do not provide an in-depth analysis of
the bidding behavior of the ANAC participants. Williams et al. [21] consider
self-play scores of the agents and also perform an empirical game theoretic anal-
ysis of the tournament results. This work focuses on stability of a strategy in a
tournament with diﬀerent mixes of opponent strategies, but unlike our work, it
does not discuss or aim to classify the characteristics of the agent’s negotiation
strategies.
7 Conclusion and Future Work
Making concessions during a negotiation is vital for getting an agreement. Suc-
cessful negotiations are only possible when both parties employ an eﬀective156 T. Baarslag, K. Hindriks, and C. Jonker
conceding strategy. Designing a good strategy of when and how much to concede
is challenging, and that is why there are many current negotiation implementa-
tions that concede in very diﬀerent ways.
In this paper, we aimed to classify a selection of current automated negotiation
strategies according to their pattern of concession making in order to gain insight
into their negotiation characteristics. We ﬁrst formally deﬁned the notion of
concession rate which gives a normalized measure of the largest concession that
was made during the negotiation. This formalizes the concept of an agent’s
willingness to concede against diﬀerent opponents.
We then presented an empirical method to eﬀectively compute the concession
rate of agents, and then applied our approach to a selection of well-known agents
(including all participants of ANAC 2010) in an experimental setting. For the
ﬁrst time, this gives insight into the strategy space of negotiation tactics em-
ployed in ANAC 2010. We subsequently used our method to classify the agents
into four categories types of concession behavior.
In addition to classifying agent strategies, we have drawn various conclusions
based on charting the experimental results. We have seen that there is indeed
a wide spread in concession rates of current agents. We established that the
chart can be useful to cluster strategy types, as similar strategies have similar
concession characteristics. Secondly, it makes it easy to understand the agent’s
main negotiation characteristics at a glance.
Some extreme agents are located in the extreme regions of the chart, while
the stronger agents form a cluster in the competitive corner. The results indicate
that in order to be successful in an automated negotiation competition, an agent
should not concede much, especially not to very cooperative strategies.
While making a number of contributions, this paper also opens up some lines
of future work. We plan to conduct a deeper investigation of the impact that
concession rates have on tournament results. The focus of this paper is on the
tournament setting of ANAC 2010, but it would be interesting to extend the
ideas presented in this paper to the results of ANAC 2011, especially because
the 2011 competition contains negotiation domains that have discount factors.
As discount factors devaluate utility with the passing of time, they require the ne-
gotiating agents to give even more consideration to eﬀective concession-making.
Secondly, the focus of this paper has been on bidding behavior, and not on
acceptance strategy. In general, this is an important part of a negotiator’s strat-
egy that also highly inﬂuences the outcome of a negotiation. We believe the
same interactions between cooperation and competition play a role when agents
decide when and whether to accept. This could provide an interesting addition
to our work, which we plan to examine in future research.
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